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In its preliminary ruling of 22 June 2017, the ECJ held that the Dutch pre-pack does 
not come under the derogation in Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/23.The reasoning of 
the ECJ will have important consequences for the pre-pack-practice and (draft) 
legislation in all EU Member States. 
Background: Project Butterfly 
In November 2013, Estro Groep BV (the largest childcare company in the 
Netherlands) entered into financial distress. Since plan A, ie consulting its lenders and 
principal shareholders in order to obtain further financing, was unsuccessful, ‘Project 
Butterfly’ came into force. Under Project Butterfly, a significant part of Estro Group 
would be transferred pursuant to a pre-pack: 243 centers out of 380 would be saved 
and 2,500 employees out of 3,600 would keep their job. 
On 10 June 2014, at the request of Estro Group, a prospective insolvency administrator 
was appointed by the District Court, Amsterdam to implement Project Butterfly. 
Whilst implementing Project Butterfly, Estro Groep only contacted H.I.G. Capital, a 
sister company of its principal shareholder, Bayside Capital, as a potential buyer. No 
other option was explored. On 20 June 2014, a limited liability company, Smallsteps 
BV, was created in order to carry out Project Butterfly. 
On 5 July 2014, Estro Group was declared insolvent. On that same day (right after the 
declaration of insolvency), the contract of the pre-packaged insolvency sale was signed 
by the insolvency administrator and Smallsteps. On 7 July 2014, the insolvency 
administrator dismissed all Estro Group employees. Smallsteps subsequently offered a 
new contract of employment to nearly 2,600 staff employed by Estro Group. 
The Federatie Nederlandse Vakvereniging (‘FNV’), a Dutch trade union organization, 
and four joint applicants (dismissed employees), brought an action before the referring 
court. The District Court, Central Netherlands decided to stay the proceedings and to 
refer to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. The main question was whether 
Directive 2001/23 must be applied in the event of a transfer of an undertaking as part 
of a pre-pack, as has been developed in practice in the Netherlands. 
The Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi 
In his opinion, AG Mengozzi argued that the protection scheme laid down in Articles 
3 and 4 of Directive 2001/23 applies to the Dutch pre-pack procedure. In coming to his 
conclusion, the AG analyzed Article 5(1) of that Directive, which reads as follows: 
‘Unless Member States provide otherwise, Articles 3 and 4 shall not apply to any 
transfer of an undertaking, business or part of an undertaking or business where the 
transferor is the subject of bankruptcy proceedings or any analogous insolvency 
proceedings which have been instituted with a view to the liquidation of the assets of 
the transferor and are under the supervision of a competent public authority (which 
may be an insolvency practioner authorised by a competent public authority)’. 
The AG started with two (preliminary) remarks concerning this Article. 
First, the Netherlands did not adopt a specific provision which provides ‘otherwise’ 
than in Article 5(1). Therefore, the exception laid down in Article 5(1), which must be 
interpreted strictly, is relevant in the present case. 
Second, Article 5(1) represents the codification of principles laid down in the case-law 
concerning Directive 77/187 (the predecessor of Directive 2001/23) developed by the 
Court: Abels; d’Urso and Others; Spano and Others; and Dethier Equipement. 
In d’Urso and Others, the Court expressly stated that ‘[g]iven all the considerations 
set out in the judgement in the Abels Case, the decisive test is therefore the purpose of 
the procedure in question’ (later affirmed in Spano and others). If the objective of the 
procedure is to liquidate the debtors’ assets in order to satisfy collectively the 
creditors’ claims, then the transfers effected under that procedure are excluded from 
the scope of Directive 77/187. On the other hand, if the objectiveof that procedure is 
also to keep the undertaking in business, the social and economic objectives thus 
pursued cannot explain nor justify the circumstance that, when the undertaking is 
transferred, its employees lose the rights which the directive confers on them. 
In Dethier Equipement, the Court fine-tuned its test: apart from the criterion of the 
purpose of the procedure, ‘account should also be taken of the form of the procedure 
in question, in particular in so far as it means that the undertaking continues or ceases 
trading, and also of the objectives of Directive 77/187’. 
When considering the objective of the Dutch pre-pack procedure, the AG finds that 
there is no doubt that the pre-pack procedure, taken as a whole, is aimed at transferring 
the undertaking (or its still viable units) in order to restart the business without any 
interruption, immediately after the declaration of insolvency. The pre-pack is merely a 
‘technical insolvency proceeding’. 
When considering the specific form of the Dutch pre-pack procedure, the AG finds 
many differences compared with the ‘traditional’ insolvency procedure. First, the 
Dutch pre-pack is always initiated by the debtor while an insolvency procedure may be 
initiated by different stakeholders. Second, the Dutch preparatory phase is entirely 
informal in nature. In particular, it is clear that the insolvency administrator and the 
court have much less influence in the case of the ‘special’ procedure leading to the 
conclusion of a pre-pack than in the case of the ‘traditional’ procedure for insolvency 
aimed at liquidating the transferors’ assets. 
The Court’s judgment 
As I had predicted in a previous post on the Corporate Finance Lab, the ECJ has 
followed the Opinion of AG Mengozzi: employees who are confronted with a pre-pack 
procedure must be protected cf Articles 3 and 4 of Directive 2001/23. 
When considering the objective of the Dutch pre-pack procedure, the ECJ stated that 
the real objective of the pre-pack procedure is the preservation of the business. The 
fact that creditors will receive more under a pre-pack procedure than under a 
liquidation procedure does not alter the fact that the main goal of the pre-pack 
procedure is the preservation (and not the liquidation) of the business. 
When considering the form of the Dutch pre-pack procedure, the ECJ repeats the 
arguments which were already expressed by the AG: there is no real supervision of a 
competent public authority. 
The impact of the judgement: Belgium as a case study 
For the time being, the Belgian minister of Justice has decided to withdraw its 
legislative proposal concerning the pre-pack. I am inclined to say that was a smart 
move. 
First of all, the explanatory memorandum states the following: ‘[c]et article suit le 
modèle qui sera également prévu dans la future législation néerlandaise. Il est certain 
que la finalité d’une telle procédure est de préserver la continuité de l’entreprise ou 
des activités’. The ultimate objective of the Belgian pre-pack is thus not 
liquidation, ie,‘maximizing the payment of the creditors’ collective claims’. To the 
contrary: preservation of the business is the goal. As a consequence, the Belgian draft 
legislation would not have passed the first part of the test (liquidation objective). 
Second, the specific form of the pre-pack differs from the form of a ‘normal’ 
liquidation procedure. Similar to the pre-pack practice in the Netherlands, the Belgian 
draft legislation stipulated that only the debtor (and thus no other stakeholders, such as 
creditors) can initiate the pre-pack procedure. Although the Belgian pre-pack 
procedure would not be informal – since there would be formal legislation –, the 
prospective insolvency administrator and the prospective juge-commissaire would 
have much less influence than the insolvency administrator and juge-commissaire in a 
traditional liquidation procedure. After all, during the preparatory phase, the debtor 
(read: the management, controlled by the majority shareholders) stays in control: the 
debtor asks for a pre-pack procedure, conducts the negotiations, ultimately adopts the 
necessary decisions and can even fire the prospective insolvency administrator. In the 
second phase of the pre-pack procedure, ie the “normal” liquidation procedure, the 
prospective insolvency actors become by default – although not always (for my critical 
reflections on this, see here) – the ‘normal’ insolvency actors. Since they have to act 
quickly (to keep the going concern value intact), they will mostly approve the pre-
packaged insolvency sale without any further investigation (Note that the ECJ thinks 
the same, §56-57). After all, the ones who need to be monitored become the 
monitors… For these reasons, I think the Belgian legislator would have had a hard 
time proving they passed the second part of the test (form of liquidation procedure). 
A longer version of this post has appeared here. 
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